US Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 18601941 Andrew J Birtle 9781944961176 Books
Download As PDF : US Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 18601941 Andrew J Birtle 9781944961176 Books
It has long been accepted that the U.S. Army did not have an official, codified, written doctrine for the conduct of counterguerrilla, pacification, and nation-building activities prior to World War II. The absence of a formal, written doctrine, however, does not mean that American soldiers did not develop concepts and theories about such activities, some of which became enduring principles that guided Army operations for decades despite their meager mention in the manuals of the day. It is the contention of this book that there was a strong continuity in the manner in which the U.S. Army performed counterinsurgency and overseas constabulary missions in the century that preceded the outbreak of World War II and that some of the central principles governing the conduct of such operations were indeed incorporated into official Army doctrinal literature prior to America’s entry into that conflict. Intellectual history—the tracing of the evolution of thought and ideas over time—is a tricky business. Showing continuity and change in thought and action is difficult, but explaining how it came about is even tougher. Writers studying the evolution of military doctrine are usually aided in their endeavors by the existence of official manuals that codify the state of military thinking at a particular point in time. Unfortunately, such manuals are often silent on the less conventional aspects of the military art. Moreover, one must remember that a system of comprehensive doctrinal manuals in the modern sense did not exist in the nineteenth century and was still in its infancy during the early decades of the twentieth. Consequently, the student of military theory is forced to cast a wider net, studying not only manuals, but curricular materials, textbooks, war plans, and the less official publications of individual soldiers. Murkier still, but no less real, is the realm of personal experience, folkways, and institutional norms that can be acquired and passed down over time. Anthropologists maintain that oral tradition can be a powerful force governing the conduct of human cultures and institutions. The fact that such traditions are not written down denies neither their existence nor their significance. Students of military thought, therefore, must look at deeds as well as words, because by studying the actions of past soldiers, we may gain insight into the principles and beliefs underlying their behavior. I examined all such sources then, official and unofficial, words as well as deeds, to gain insights into the Army’s approach to counterinsurgency and contingency operations. This volume covers a lot of ground—nearly a century of time and occurrences that span the globe. Although many different events are mentioned, this book is not intended to be an operational history. Similarly, while the volume touches upon subjects as diverse as military government, military law, and tactics, it does not present a comprehensive review of each of these distinct doctrinal areas. Rather, it examines these and other subjects selectively to gain insight into what the pre–World War II Army came to call “small wars”—the interrelated fields of counterguerrilla warfare, pacification, and overseas constabulary and contingency operations. Though never credited with a manual of its own, during the century that preceded the outbreak of World War II a loose body of theory, doctrine, thought, and precedent gradually evolved within the U.S. Army into what one might call, to paraphrase Russell Weigley, an American way of small wars.
US Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 18601941 Andrew J Birtle 9781944961176 Books
The U.S. Army Command & General Staff College issues Birtle's text to all students (rank of major) in the Command & General Staff Officer's Course. The author works as a historian for the U.S. Army Center for Military History in Washington D.C. His research and thoughts about contingency operations during the interwar periods provide invaluable guidance to current leaders in the Army. The author clearly writes about the issues that affect the use of the military during times of relative peace. He outlines cavalry duty in the American West, as well as nation building and counterinsurgency operations in Cuba, the Philippines, and Panama. Throughout the book Birtle provides insightful commentary on issues that are just as relevant today as they were in the 19th century.- contingency operations tend to be fought at the small unit level by Captains, Lieutenants and NCO's
- many times for the participants the conflict seems more like a battle against nature than against an enemy
- Army institutional training ignores counterinsurgency/ contingency operations, instead focusing on training leaders to strive to win the "big" battles
- leaders need to understand economics, culture and politics since the military instrument may not be the dominant factor in foreign policy
- and many more
The author cites many other factors which affect military capabilities during these operations. Peacekeeping and enforcement missions in Bosnia, Kosovo, Somalia, and even Afghanistan exhibit similar characteristics to the types of conflicts outlined in Birtle's book. Leaders at all levels in the Army (and Marines) today would be well served to read and study the pages of U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1860-1941. This book substantiates the age old maxim that those unfamiliar with the harsh lessons of history are doomed to repeat them.
Highly recommended for the military professional.
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US Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 18601941 Andrew J Birtle 9781944961176 Books Reviews
Birtle explains how the US Army has always been torn between preparing for Big War while actually fighting a series of small wars. The Army studied and wrote doctrine on how to fight the Big One, but never considered the small ones worth that effort. His book covers this phenomenon in the 19th & early 20th Centuries, and it doesn't take a lot of research to figure out that the Army has continued to neglect studying and writing doctrine for the small ones, including Vietnam and now Iraq.
Andrew Birtle provides a succinct history of the U.S. Armies reluctance to embrace small scale wars and how it continues to focus on large wars and grand battles. Birtle's extensive research clearly details how soldiers became governors, constables, judges, diplomats, explorers, colonizers, educators, administrators, and engineers'. Current policy makers and soldiers will find this work relevant in today's chaotic battlefields. The fundamentals of insurgency and counterinsurgency are as relevant today as they were when the U.S. Cavalry rode the plains or the U.S. Army put down the Philippine insurrection. Birtle has demonstrated the ingenuity and dedication of Soldiers and how they dealt with these complex issues in the past. Birtle's well-written account offers valuable insights on how to think about and conduct similar operations.
Birtle commendably presents a summary of counterinsurgency doctrine in the Army for the period 1860-1941. He does an excellent job not only identifying what the doctrine was, he explains how it was propagated in an Army that not only had no institutional plan for recording the doctrine, but also intentionally tried to minimize recording specifics since a central feature of the doctrine was that action was to be locally determined at the small unit level.
Anyone interested in counterinsurgency and/or the US Army's handling of it would do well to read this book and its companion volume which picks up with the next era. One can not only trace through this book why the Marine Corps became the main American counterinsurgent force in the first half of the twentieth century, but also see how the Army would eventually stray from its doctrine from this period to the failed approach used in Vietnam which was run from the headquarters in Saigon and the White House in direct contravention of the idea to fight flexibly with local control.
The U.S. Army Command & General Staff College issues Birtle's text to all students (rank of major) in the Command & General Staff Officer's Course. The author works as a historian for the U.S. Army Center for Military History in Washington D.C. His research and thoughts about contingency operations during the interwar periods provide invaluable guidance to current leaders in the Army. The author clearly writes about the issues that affect the use of the military during times of relative peace. He outlines cavalry duty in the American West, as well as nation building and counterinsurgency operations in Cuba, the Philippines, and Panama. Throughout the book Birtle provides insightful commentary on issues that are just as relevant today as they were in the 19th century.
- contingency operations tend to be fought at the small unit level by Captains, Lieutenants and NCO's
- many times for the participants the conflict seems more like a battle against nature than against an enemy
- Army institutional training ignores counterinsurgency/ contingency operations, instead focusing on training leaders to strive to win the "big" battles
- leaders need to understand economics, culture and politics since the military instrument may not be the dominant factor in foreign policy
- and many more
The author cites many other factors which affect military capabilities during these operations. Peacekeeping and enforcement missions in Bosnia, Kosovo, Somalia, and even Afghanistan exhibit similar characteristics to the types of conflicts outlined in Birtle's book. Leaders at all levels in the Army (and Marines) today would be well served to read and study the pages of U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1860-1941. This book substantiates the age old maxim that those unfamiliar with the harsh lessons of history are doomed to repeat them.
Highly recommended for the military professional.
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